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This paper assembles some evidence on developments in investment by incumbent and alternative telecommunications operators during the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The quality of data on investment is not in general sufficient to clearly differentiate between investment by new entrants and investment by incumbents. Definitional problems also exist in that the players in communication markets are no longer the traditional alternative operators providing voice services, but a range of service providers including Internet Service Providers and cable television service providers who, through cable modems, provide VoIP services and broadband access. As such it is much harder to make judgements about how policy impacts on investment. Although the period 2000-2005 coincides with the development of broadband in most OECD countries and the implementation of LLU, the paper does not try to show a correlation between investment and unbundling policies.
Part of the period coincides with the so called "dot-com bubble" during which a large number of telecommunication operators speculated in Internet related activities over a period ranging roughly from 1998 to 2000. Any examination of the relationship between policies and investment needs to factor in the impact of the "dot-com bubble", including companies" acquisition of bankrupt carriers preceding it: although there is sufficient data since the "dot-com bubble" burst 7 years ago. Some studies which tried to correlate policies and investment have tended to ignore the impact of the "dot-com bubble" on investment.
Data on investment by new entrants is also important in order to determine to what extent service competition leads to facilities competition, and therefore results in further investment in networks. Arguments, mainly in Europe, about the "ladder of investment" imply that new entrants will eventually shift their business models away from service competition, developed mainly on the basis of local loop unbundling policies, relying increasingly on self-provided networks. However, regulators in many cases do not obtain sufficient data in order, particularly from new entrants, to monitor sufficiently the extent that their policies may impact on investment.
THE INFLUENCE OF MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICIES ON TELECOMMUNICATION INVESTMENT

Trends in telecommunication investment
This paper aims to gather evidence on developments in investment in the telecommunication sector by incumbent operators and new entrants in order to clarify developments in investment during the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . OECD data on telecommunication investment (provided for example in the Communications Outlooks and in the Telecommunication Database) has not differentiated investment according to whether companies were incumbents or new entrants. Indeed, few regulators (or statistical agencies) differentiate between sources of investment. The OECD investment data includes all investment by fixed and mobile operators and is obtained from member countries through an annual questionnaire.
One of the most interesting features of the latest OECD data collection on telecommunications was the return of growth in telecommunication investment. Indeed 2004 showed an increase in total OECD investment in telecommunications since the "dot-com bubble" burst in 2000. Since 1980 when the OECD began collecting data on telecommunication investment, growth (in current USD) has shown, for the OECD as a whole, a steady trend from USD 52 billion in 1980, reaching a peak of USD 238. The ratio of telecommunication investment to overall OECD gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) has been remarkably stable from 1980 to 1995 at 2.5% ( Figure 2 ) so that, in general, telecommunication investment in the OECD countries grew at the same pace as total investment. The period 1995 to 2000 saw a significant rise in investment as a result of liberalisation, the fact that many incumbents began to digitalise their networks, and the significant investment in mobile cellular networks as these were developed to replace analogue mobile networks and were extended to provide close to 100% of geographic coverage. The rapid increase in telecommunication investment led to the ratio of telecommunication investment to GFCF reaching a peak of 4.4% in 2000. As Figure 2 shows the recent recuperation of telecommunication investment is resulting in telecommunication investment attaining its historical trend rate of around 2.5% as a ratio of GFCF. The development of the "dot-com bubble" during this period also accounted for the rapid increase in investment. On a geographical basis, North America has been leading the OECD in telecommunication investment since 1995 in terms of total volume (current prices) (Figure 1) , reaching a 54% share in 2001. But, North America (mainly the United States) also saw the most drastic reduction in investment in this sector with total investment declining from USD 123 billion in 2000 to USD 58 billion in 2003. In comparison in the OECD European countries, the reduction went from USD 67 billion in 1999 to USD 50.6 billion in 2003. On a per capita basis (Table 1) country performance varied considerably. The strong demand for a growing variety of broadband enabled Internet services such as IPTV and radio ( Figure 3 ) has provided an important incentive to service providers to upgrade their facilities and invest in new technologies which is stimulating further investment growth in the sector. Recent indications from many telecommunication operators planning in investing in fibre in the local loop, and in wireless broadband technologies lead to expectations that investment growth will continue in the future. Although telecommunication markets began to open to new entrants in the mid-1990s (earlier for some countries), the incumbent operators were still the most significant investors in the telecommunications sector ( Figure 4 ) accounting for 73% of the sector"s investment in 2005. After the "dot-com bubble" burst, investment from incumbents operators decreased relatively more than investment by new entrants and for a 3-year period accounted for 62% to 64% of the total telecommunication investment ( Figure 4 ). The trend in incumbent operators" investment, specifically on fixed networks ( Figure 5 ), decreased as well after the "dot-com bubble" burst but is now recovering. Investment by incumbents in fixed networks seems to be relatively stable ranging from 48% to 56% of their total investment ( Figure 6 ). The investment trend for the alternative operators is more difficult to evaluate as the data are not easily available, but reviewing data from 9 countries show a decreasing trend for the last 6 years following to some extent the same downward trend as for incumbents but without any significant upward trend visible for the time being (Figure 7 ). 
Investment and competition
By the late 1990s most OECD countries had opened up their telecommunication markets to full competition. Second generation mobile networks had also to a large part been deployed. The focus of policy in many countries changed from stimulating competition in voice markets to developing broadband services. With the shift from dial-up Internet to broadband and the fact that most countries viewed the development of broadband as having significant economic and social benefits, a number of countries began to adopt policies on broadband development either through facilities competition or through service competition based on local loop unbundling (LLU). Those countries using LLU viewed this as a stepping stone to facilities-based competition.
1 By the early 2000s most European OECD countries had in the context of EU Directives adopted local loop unbundling frameworks. The development of broadband and broadband competition has led to new services, such as those provided by multiple play, and further expansion in broadband markets, in particular the provision of higher speeds and the development of more infrastructure competition in a number of national markets. Broadband also led to a significant increase in market entry by Internet Service Providers, who initially provided only Internet access, but overtime diversified to provide voice and video services as well as broadband access. This new market entry is, however, not always captured in telecommunication investment data since in many cases ISPs are not considered as telecommunication service providers.
Infrastructure-based competition has, in general, developed much more rapidly, in the broadband era than in the early days of opening of PSTN markets, although in the 1980s and early 1990s regulators were expecting that service competition would develop into infrastructure-based competition. 2 In those countries with extensive cable television plant, cable-based broadband, for example, competes against DSL-based broadband, and increasingly both face competition from wireless providers as well. In addition to the promotion of competition, the promotion of innovation and investment has also been regarded as an important policy issue for some regulators. For example, in the United States, the FCC has followed a consistent policy of lesser regulation or unbundling for facilities supporting new services. Indeed in this context many incumbents and some regulators have taken the position that LLU obligations are a disincentive to investment and innovation given that new investment in the local loop may have to be shared with new entrants. These arguments have become more pronounced as incumbents and new entrants began considering whether to invest in fibre networks in the local loop.
A counter-argument, especially in Europe, has been based on the "ladder of investment", whereby service competition and investment in new services facilitated by regulatory decisions such as LLU, are viewed as the initial rungs of a ladder which, by creating competition and allowing new entrants to create rapidly a customer base, generates immediate revenue. This early service competition, it has been argued, eventually stimulates further investment by new entrants allowing them to move up the investment ladder leading eventually to investment in their own facilities and, in particular, competition in the local loop.
The ladder of investment
The "ladder of investment" debate has essentially argued that:
3  Access regulation can encourage entry by setting efficient access charges to stimulate entry by new entrants to wholesale products, who would otherwise have difficulties in replicating incumbent networks" bottleneck facilities.
 New entrants making use of these access charges initially occupy the lowest "rung" of the ladder such as reselling the incumbent"s services, before moving up the ladder to offer services closer to customer premises.
 New entrants can then consolidate their market position by increasing their customer and revenue bases and are able to provide ever more facilities-based services to retail customers. At this point regulatory authorities have a range of options available either by removing mandated access to lower rung wholesale access services or by gradually raising the price of those access products. As a result, new entrants having gained sufficient financial strength can start to move up the ladder for the purpose of searching for better margins created by wholesale and retail prices differences, although incumbents" discretion to set margins available to competitors should be tempered by regulatory or competition law constraints over price squeezes. In relation to broadband access, this process stems initially from other access products such as IP-based and ATM-based bitstream access and then proceeds into using shared and finally fully unbundled local loops.
 Ultimately what occurs is that new entrants will start investing in their own telecommunications infrastructure and that facilities-based competition rather than services-based competition will develop. 4 Concern has been expressed that service-based competition, as it is linked to LLU in its lessdeveloped context, cannot transform fragmented competition, which is dependent on the incumbent"s technical choices, into robust facility-based competition. 5 Some have argued that the "ladder of investment" concept is too theoretical and as such does not provide a model for regulators to manage. For example, regulators may have to decide the right sequence of rungs and construct a number of different ladders since new entrants may have different requirements for service provision. Some quantitative analysis in the United States has suggested that the share of alternative operators (competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC)) lines that are facility-based is lower in states where the wholesale price of unbundled lines is lower, implying that LLU decreases facility-based competition. 6 The European Commission's 12th Implementation report has collated data from EU Member States which according to the Commission showed that "[n]ew entrants, spurred on by adequate access price regulation, are climbing the ladder of investment by moving away from bitstream access (5.13 million lines) towards local loop unbundling (13.89 million lines) in the provision of broadband services". 
Intermodal competition
Investment decisions may currently be influenced by intermodal competitions where, for example, fixed and cable operators are struggling to provide bundled services to offer multiple play packages. This is the case, for example, in the United States where cable modem broadband service is preferred to copper line based DSL service with the former having 34 % of the market as compared to a 28 % by xDSL in the high speed line market as of June 2006 8 and where fixed operators are willing to invest in large part for fear of losing market share to cable operators. Fixed and mobile wireless intrusions are also a significant factor for fixed operators.
Other broadband related services, for example, cable telephony in the United States may cause the loss of lines for fixed operators 9 . As cable operators upgrade networks to achieve higher speeds (using Docsis 3.0) competition between the fixed line operators and cable can be expected to increase.
Although high speed wireless networks may not offer the same characteristics as fixed networks, for an increasing number of users they are becoming the main means of access to communication services. As operators shift their service from second generation networks to third generation networks, the shift to "mobile only" households may increase. There are two factors driving investment in wireless networks. First, the declining revenue per user in 2G services has pushed mobile operators to seek other revenue opportunities. Second, fixed network operators are increasing looking at offering fixed-mobile convergence services which may eventually start competing with mobile services.
Sub loop unbundling
Within the EU context, "local sub loop" means a partial local loop connecting the network termination point at the subscriber"s premises to a concentration point or a specified intermediate access point in the fixed public telephone network. 10 It is required that alternative operators can interconnect with the local access network at a point (street cabinet) between the incumbent"s exchange and the end user premises. Sub loop unbundling has not been utilised much. For example, KPN, the incumbent in the Netherlands, is obliged to offer sub-loop unbundling but there was no formal demand for this type of unbundling as of the end of 2004. However, with the increasing provision of advanced services, such as IPTV, DSL technologies which are able to deliver sufficient access speeds over copper loops of up to 1 km from the exchange, but whose speed drops quickly for longer loops, have not been able to cope with the increasing needs for bandwidthconsuming offerings. Rather, there is the possibility that fibre to the cabinet (often called fibre to the nodes [FTTN]) will be required in order to deliver the high-speed services to the local street cabinet and consequently, shorter copper loops with state-of-the-art technology such as VDSL (Very High Speed DSL) will be favoured in order to send them along the copper pair to the end user"s premises.
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On the other hand, if the alternative operators install their own equipment adjacent to the street cabinet rather than at the incumbent"s exchange and utilise the sub loop, they can offer high bandwidth services which can only be sent for a short distance on the copper networks, provided they do not use the unbundled fibre networks.
Some analysis indicates that the costs of sub loop unbundling are substantial. Basic cost factors are: new equipment at each cabinet which is likely to include a multi-service access node to deliver voice and data services; co-location facilities; backhaul links to individual street cabinets; writing-off of the value of equipment and co-location facilities (stranded investment). But according to the analysis the most difficult facet for alternative operators using sub loop unbundling is the limited economies of scale that they will be able to achieve. While the alternative operator with a modest market share of the DSL market might expect to gain 500 or more customers at a major exchange, it may only be possible to gain 10-20 customers at a single street cabinet. In contrast, the total costs for full unbundling does not change much even if the number of customers per exchange area are few. 
Market description in terms of OECD countries telecommunications investment
In examining the policy impact of investment, in particular when it relates to LLU, it is important to differentiate between the date when LLU was introduced through legislation or regulatory decision and the date when LLU became effective in that decisions on prices for unbundled loops, conditions of delivery for loops, collocation, etc., took in some cases several years before a satisfactory solution was agreed to. Most of the European Union OECD countries introduced LLU from around 2001 to 2002 (Table 2 ), when they implemented into national law the EU directive or regulations regarding unbundled access to the local loop.
14 LLU was introduced much earlier in some countries, such as Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the US. At that time, broadband was not so widespread and the main telecommunications service was voice, so that LLU did not play an important role. With the introduction of LLU, access to broadband using DSL has been provided by alternative operators as well as incumbent operators varying from country to country. Data for European countries ( Figure 9 ) indicate that from 2005 to 2006 the proportion of DSL offered by incumbents has decreased while that of alternative operators has increased, mainly through full unbundling. Figure 10 shows the total consolidated capital expenditures of incumbent operators in OECD countries (see also data in Annex). Consolidated capital expenditure includes all of the activities of enterprises so it can include fixed, mobile, or international operations. The effect of the "dot-com bubble", including companies" acquisition of bankrupt carriers preceding it, as discussed in the first section, is evident in the sharp reduction in investment from 2000 to 2002. 2) Australia, France and Germany include portions of international operations.
General trend of the investments by incumbent operators in the OECD countries
Trends in incumbent investment
The investment performance of incumbent operators for OECD countries is shown in the following graphics covering the period 2000 to 2005 (see also data in Annex). These data are collected directly from annual reports of telecommunication operators. In some cases data is not sufficient to differentiate between the total telecommunication investment of a company from the fixed network investment. The bar charts show total telecommunication investment by incumbents (white bar) and capital expenditure for the fixed network by incumbents (black bar). For some countries total telecommunication investment (consolidated investment) may include mobile network operations and international investments, while fixed network investment data may at times also include international investment (when it was not possible to exclude it from the data).
The right-hand graphic for countries shows the year to year growth of fixed network investment (unless these data were not available) as a dotted line and the trend line in investment (bolded line). In cases in which data for "capital expenditures for fixed network activities" are not available, the growth rate and its trend is calculated from figures of "consolidated capital expenditures".
Almost all OECD countries were affected in different ways by the "dot-com bubble", including companies" acquisition of bankrupt carriers preceding it, and their investment cycle seems to differ with some countries seeing a slowdown in investment by incumbents during 2004-2005 whereas others, most impacted by the "dot-com bubble", were increasing investment levels back to those of 2000. The growth in communication markets spurred on by broadband undoubtedly played a part in stimulating investment in most countries as incumbents upgraded their networks to support xDSL and in many cases to provide wholesale access to 3 rd parties. The decline in the number of fixed line subscribers experienced by many incumbent operators resulting from mobile substitution has led many incumbents to place emphasis on broadband services and in offering triple play. So that, although there is no evidence of any Note: Only AT&T's 'capital expenditures for fixed network business' are not available, so 'consolidated capital expenditures' are used instead.
Investment by alternative operators
Investment data for alternative fixed operators are difficult to obtain. In spite of this, such investment has played an important role, for example, for the United States where cable operators took the early lead in mass market broadband deployment and alternative operators (rather than incumbents) took the early lead in FTTH deployment. Figure 13 only provides investment data for alternative operators in 9 OECD countries (see also data in Annex). The left hand graphic for each country in Figure 13 shows investment during 2000-2005 by alternative fixed operators. The right hand graphic in Figure 13 for each country shows in bold lines the ratio of investments by all alternative fixed operators as a percentage of investments by all fixed operators in the country. The year-to-year growth rate in investment by alternative operators is shown by a dotted line and the non-bolded line indicates the trend line.
The data in Figure 13 indicate that for a number of countries the ratio of investment by alternative fixed operators to total fixed telecommunication investment declined (Italy, Japan, Portugal, United States) indicating a faster growth in investment by incumbents. At the same time several countries experienced a rising trend in investment by alternative operators (Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Japan, Portugal, and Switzerland).
In reference to countries which do not have a dot-com trend explicitly, Hungary indicates a significant increase in the growth rate just after the implementation of the LLU. In Sweden "investments by all alternative fixed operators over investments by all fixed operators" sharply increased from 10% to 60 %. Investments by ISPs may or may not be considered as investment by alternative operators. In many cases the major ISPs are owned and operated by the incumbent telecommunication operator. Investment by ISPs not owned by incumbent telecommunication operators would normally be considered as investment by alternative operators, but much of this data is not included in these data, since these companies have not been considered as telecommunication operators. However, it is these ISPs who have benefited most from LLU policies. An example of an ISP which is both an incumbent in its own market and a new entrant in other markets is Wanadoo, a brand name of France Telecom. Although data are available for all Wanadoo investments, a country by country breakdown of data are not available. Figure 14 shows the development of investment by Wanadoo. In some markets this investment has increased in recent years, for example, investment by Wanadoo U.K. 
Other issues (investment in fibre networks)
Data for investment in fibre networks, at least for 2000 to 2005, are not readily available except for Japan or Korea, although the situation is changing as an increasing number of incumbent operators start to invest in Next Generation Network (NGN) access networks. Generally speaking, the proportion of investment in fibre networks as a proportion of investment in total fixed networks by incumbent operators is not available. However, data from the Japanese incumbent, NTT, show that after 2001 the proportion of investment in fibre networks has been fairly constant, in the region of 40 % (Figure 15 ). Data about investment by alternative operators in fibre networks in Japan are not available, but it is clear that alternative operators increasingly use NTT's fibre at NTT buildings ( Figure 16 ). In Japan FTTH subscriptions are increasing while DSL subscriptions are decreasing, especially in metropolitan areas. 17 In France both the incumbent and new entrants have started to invest in fibre networks and even alternative operators such as Iliad (Free) is expressing its intention to unbundle its own fibre networks. In Korea, for example, the fibre deployment pilot project in Gwangju City is aims to deploy fibre infrastructure to 20 thousand subscribers in 5 years (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) and to provide convergence services through a 100 Mb/s optical pipe. 19 The project is expected to cost approximately USD 119.4 million but will not require government subsidies for investment or subsidised loans although it is implemented under the scope of the "839 strategy" planned by the government.
Regulation and investment
The volume of investment can vary in accordance with the aims or priorities set by operators depending on demand for services and products, competition, as well as on regulatory considerations. Unfortunately, the quality of data on investment by new entrants in telecommunication markets is poor. Definitional problems also exist in that the players in communication markets are no longer the traditional alternative operators providing voice services but a range of service providers including Internet Service Providers and cable television service providers who, through cable modems, provide VoIP services and broadband access. As such it is much harder to make judgements about how various policies, for example, local loop unbundling, impacts on investment. The track record of countries with unbundling, as measured by the number of fully unbundled lines, would indicate that unbundling policies have been successful at least as far as creating competition to incumbents in a number of xDSL markets and in providing voice competition. For example, following the introduction of functional separation of the incumbent operator BT and the creation of the separate access division, Openreach, there has been a significant and substantial increase in the take-up of unbundled local loops by alternative communications providers in the United Kingdom. According to figures from the Office of the Telecommunications Adjudicator (OTA), the number of unbundled local loops for communication providers reached 2.247 million lines by May 2007: there were less than 200,000 lines unbundled prior to the introduction of functional separation in the United Kingdom. 20 At the end of 2006 France had 2.1 million fully unbundled local loops and the total for the EU was 4.1 million fully unbundled lines at the end of 2006 representing 7.5% of total lines in the EU. 21 In this context the EC has empirical evidence that the proportion of resale has fallen in favour of new entrants taking up bitstream access and also shifting from bitstream access to the use of unbundled lines, giving some indication that the "ladder of investment" is indeed working. 22 However, in contrast, US carriers have also undertaken significant investment in upgrading their networks to high speed broadband but have not been subject to extensive unbundling requirements.
As indicated at the beginning of this paper, a number of studies which have tried to correlate unbundling and investment have tended to ignore the impact of the "dot-com bubble" on investment. They also have tended to ignore the complexity of ensuring that effective unbundling is in place. Unbundling has required a number of decisions including determinations on pricing for fully unbundled local loops, collocation decisions, etc. In many countries the implementation of these decisions took one or more years after a decision to require mandatory unbundling was put in place. Thus, until unbundling policies have been fully put in place, it is difficult to support conclusions on their effectiveness in stimulating investment with hard data.
The question of whether service competition leads to facilities competition, and therefore results in further investment in networks, is more complex, partly because investment in broadband facilities has also been robust in some countries that disfavour unbundling. However, data from some countries, such as France, indicate that new entrants that began offering services through unbundling are changing strategy and beginning to invest in their own networks. Neuf Cegetel in announcing its plans for FTTH in April 2007 indicated that it would cover areas which would not cost much and that it would also examine costsharing with other operators if possible. 23 One argument in favour of such a strategy is that, once a certain market size is attained in terms of number of customers, it becomes cheaper to construct a network taking into account savings made from not paying monthly rental charges to the incumbent for unbundled lines. On this basis it will only be the new entrants which have reached a certain market size and possibly only those in the larger urban centres that will construct networks. Since a high percentage of the cost in network construction is for the rights of way and related engineering, the shift to facilities-based investment may only occur where access to rights of way can be obtained at a reasonable price. In the Netherlands as well, new fibre deployment has occurred by new entrants.
A further complication is that as the communications network becomes all IP, investment in networks will shift from copper to fibre and, depending on the architecture of the fibre network, sub-loop unbundling may become the focus for alternative operators. Fibre to the cabinet (see Figure 8 ) could have significant adverse effects for alternative operators using the LLU, particularly if the incumbent sells off its existing exchanges to pay for fibre installation, i.e. the LLU at the exchange will not be available any more. The Association of Licensed Telecoms Operators (ALTO) in Ireland, for example, expressed concern over the delivery of the next-generation network by Eircom, the Irish incumbent, because investments by alternative telecommunication operators in the LLU could be rendered obsolete. 24 In this scenario, alternative operators may have to choose between withdrawing from the LLU-based product to a wholesale DSL product (Bitstream) for the time being and investing in sub-loop unbundling at the street cabinet. 25 The latter especially means that alternative operators will have to commit significant amounts of investment to build fibre from their equipment to the cabinets in order to unbundle sub-loops or investment in incumbent"s local buildings (exchanges) in order to unbundle fibre local loops and copper sub loops (see Figure 8) . 26 In the United States, incumbent operators must provide public notice of any network change that will affect a competing operator"s performance or ability to provide service when incumbent operators retire copper loops or sub-loops they have replaced with FTTH loops; and parties are allowed to file objections to the incumbent operator"s notice of such retirement. 
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